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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States leads the world in making treaties and in publicly
holding other countries accountable when they fail to fully comply with
treaty obligations.1 Nonetheless, the United States sometimes fails to satisfy
its obligations under binding international agreements. Due to the actions of
numerous states, the United States is in violation of its treaty obligations
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention governs the
Convention).2
“communications and contact with nationals of the sending State” requiring
the country who has incarcerated a non-citizen to notify the non-citizen’s
consulate “without delay.”3 Many states in the United States fail to notify a
non-citizen’s consulate after incarceration, and post Medellin,4 the United
States has been unable to rectify this failure in instances where foreign
nationals may have procedurally defaulted on their claims. Multiple nations
are disgusted with the manner in which the United States has handled the
situation. For example, Mexico has written to several U.S. representatives in
Congress and reprimanded the United States’ behavior at international
forums.5
The primary concern with the United States’ failure to comply with the
Vienna Convention is the treatment that incarcerated U.S. citizens are
receiving abroad. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Medellin I, there have
been numerous instances and high profile stories of Americans imprisoned or
arrested in foreign nations.6 If the United States is not honoring foreign
1
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 2014/2015 – SUPPLEMENT, http://0-heinonl
ine.org.gavel.law.uga.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.ustreaties/tif2015&div=2&start_page=1&c
ollection=weaties&set_as_cursor=1&men_tab=srchresults (identifying hundreds of treaties in
force between the United States and other countries on a variety of subjects).
2
See generally Cardenas v. Stephens, 820 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2016); Ramos v. Davis, No. 0870044, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12091 (5th Cir. June 30, 2016) (discussing foreign detainees’
criminal appeals based on the alleged U.S. violation of consular notification under the Vienna
Convention).
3
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261. In this Note, the state in which a person is arrested is called the receiving state,
since it receives a consul of another state, while the national’s home state is called the sending
state, since it sends its consul.
4
Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
5
See, e.g., Letter from Eduardo Medina Mora, Ambassador to Mexico, to Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman of House Judiciary Committee (July 10, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/do
cuments/3037224-Letter-from-Ambassador-of-Mexico-to-Bob-Goodlatte.html.
6
See, e.g., Rachel Donadio, American Testifies in Her Murder Trial in Italy, N.Y. TIMES,
(June 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/world/europe/13italy.html (reporting on
the murder trial of American student Amanda Knox, who was studying abroad in Italy, and her
testimony at the trial); Nazila Fathi & Mark Landler, In Turnabout, Iran Releases U.S.
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visitors’ rights to contact their consulates after they have been arrested or
detained, why should other countries offer U.S. citizens the same rights?
The truth is that often those countries do not offer U.S. citizens such rights.7
As U.S. citizens increase their travel abroad, providing assistance and
protection to Americans should be a top priority for the U.S. government.8
But nothing has yet been done to ensure every state in the United States is
required to honor the nation’s obligations under the Vienna Convention. It is
the position of this Note that the only way the United States can begin to
patch its relations with other nations and protect U.S. citizens travelling
abroad is through sufficient legislation passed by Congress ensuring that all
fifty states comply with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. First, this
Note will discuss the historical development of consular relations and effects
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United States. Next,
it will address why past proposed legislation and other proposed solutions to
fix America’s non-compliance with the Vienna Convention have failed.
Finally, this Note will analyze the past proposed legislation and suggest
legislation for the U.S. Congress to implement, or state legislation in the
alternative, in order to remedy this very serious problem.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSULAR RELATIONS
A. Brief History and Overview of Consular Relations Law
Consular relations have existed between sovereign states for centuries,
even dating back to ancient Greece.9 The scope of the duties of the Greek
counterparts to consuls were quite different, but they were nevertheless
“responsible for representing the interests of their nationals.”10 Yet, the word

Journalist, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/world/middleast/1
2iran.html (reporting on Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi’s imprisonment in Iran); see
also, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer & Rebecca Cathcart, An Intimate Homecoming is Played out in
Public, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/us/06families.html
(reporting on the release of American journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling from North Korea).
7
See Louis Klarevas, Locked Up Abroad, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 4, 2011), http://foreign
policy.com/2011/10/04/locked-up-abroad-2/ (giving multiple examples of Americans detained
abroad and their ignored requests for consulate access).
8
See Nat’l Travel & Tourism Office, U.S. Citizen International Outbound Travel up Eight
Percent in 2015 (Mar. 21, 2016), http://travel.trade.gov/tinews/archive/tinews2016/20160321.
asp (analyzing the increasing percentage of U.S. travel overseas).
9
William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 259 (1998).
10
Yury A. Kolesnikov, Meddling with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The
Dilemma and Proposed Statutory Solutions, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 179, 184 (2009).
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consul did not come into existence “until the time of the Romans.”11 The
term originally signified “chief magistrates appointed in southern European
cities,” but by the eleventh century, the definition had extended to
magistrates sent to foreign cities as well.12 The growth of trade between
nations promoted the development of the consular system.13 Nations began
sending their own consulates to other nations in order “to supervise their
commerce, protect national interests, and adjudicate disputes between
merchants.”14 This increase in consular relations promoted trade, but when
centralized state authority began asserting direct control over the relations,
“confusion over the exact status” of the consulate officials ensued.15 The
lack of clear guidance prompted many nations to create treaties on the
matter.16 Therefore, by the middle of the twentieth century, the rules
governing consular relations derived from bilateral treaties and the
customary international law that developed from such agreements.17
The United States has recognized the importance of providing protection
to nationals abroad though consulates for the past two-hundred years.18 But
it was not until the mid-1950s that the entire international community
identified “the need to codify the existing rules and practices governing
consular relations.”19 Accordingly, the General Assembly of the United
Nations (U.N.) tasked the International Law Commission with drafting a
multilateral convention that would bring more uniformity to the laws
The International Law Commission
governing consular relations.20
eventually adopted the Draft Articles on Consular Relations on July 7,
1961.21 Subsequently, the Conference on Consular Relations met in Vienna,
Austria from March 4 until April 22, 1963 to prepare an international
agreement on consular relations.22 There were over ninety countries and
several international organizations in attendance, and on April 24 of 1963,
11

Id.
Id.
13
LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (George W. Keeton & Georg
Schwarzenberger eds., 1961).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 6. The first treaty specifically referencing the functions, privileges, and immunities
of consuls was the Franco-Spanish Convention of Pardo of March 13, 1769.
17
Kolesnikov, supra note 10, at 185.
18
Cindy Galway Buys, Scott D. Pollock & Ioana Navarette Pellicer, Do Unto Others: The
Importance of Better Compliance with Consular Notification Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 461, 462 (2011).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Aceves, supra note 9, at 263.
22
Id.
12
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the Conference adopted the final text of the Vienna Convention and the
Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.23
However, the Vienna Convention did not enter into force until March 19,
1967.24 Currently, this multilateral treaty has over 170 parties to it25 and is
considered by most scholars and countries to be a codification of customary
international law, which all nations, not only the Parties to the treaty, need to
follow.26
B. General Provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
As iterated above, the Vienna Convention marked the first international
attempt to systemize existing consular practices in international law. The
preamble of the Vienna Convention recognizes the historical significance of
consular practices, stating that the Parties have agreed to the treaty, while
“[r]ecalling that consular relations have been established between peoples
since ancient times . . . [and] [b]elieving that an international convention on
consular relations, privileges and immunities would also contribute to the
development of friendly relations among nations. . . .”27 The articles of the
Vienna Convention also codify many of the consular functions nations
historically assumed. For instance, Article 5 describes the basic functions of
the consulate. Generally, consular functions encompass “protecting and
facilitating the interests of a State and its nationals in the territory of another
State.”28 The provisions of Article 5 were noncontroversial when adopted
and continue to be relevant in international relations today.29
On the other hand, the provisions of Article are at the center of
international debate. Titled “Communication and contact with nationals of
the sending State,” Article 36 reads:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them.
Nationals of the sending State shall have the same
23

Id.
Id.
25
U.N. Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, https://treaties.un.
org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280050686 (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
26
Kolesnikov, supra note 10, at 186.
27
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at Preamble.
28
Buys, Pollock & Pellicer, supra note 18, at 462–63.
29
Nicole M. Howell, A Proposal for U.S. Implementation of the Vienna Convention’s
Consular Notification Requirement, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1324, 1335 (2013).
24
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freedom with respect to communication with and access
to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular
post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner. Any communication addressed to the consular
post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this
sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or
detention, to converse and correspond with him and to
arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have
the right to visit any national of the sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention in their district in
pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers
shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national
who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly
opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are
intended.30
On first impression, the notification and access requirements of Article 36
seem to be fairly simple. Under Article 36(1)(a), consulate officials have the
right to speak freely with foreign nationals, and foreign nationals have the
right to speak freely with their consulate, despite any detention or
incarceration. Article 36(1)(b) requires the receiving State to notify the
consulate of the sending State without delay if a national of that State has
been arrested. Article 36(1)(c) requires the receiving State to allow consular
contact with the foreign national. Lastly, Article 36(2) asserts that the rights
provided for in the article must be exercised in conformity with the laws of
30

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3.
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the receiving State, but the laws and regulations cannot nullify the rights in
question.
C. The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice
Under the United Nations Charter, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
is the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”31 Nonetheless, like
most international courts, the ICJ only has jurisdiction over cases where all
parties have consented to the court’s jurisdiction to resolve a particular
dispute.32 Nations may provide consent to ICJ jurisdiction in three different
ways: “ante hoc (in advance of a dispute), ad hoc (once a dispute has arisen),
or post hoc (expressed after the case has been brought before the Court by
the other party).”33 Separate treaties are one way to consent ante hoc, and
the Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
(Optional Protocol) is one example of such a treaty. The Optional Protocol
is a voluntary agreement incorporated into the Vienna Convention, which
requires the parties to the agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ
for disputes arising from the Vienna Convention.34
Once the ICJ has jurisdiction over the case, its final decisions are binding
on the nations that are parties to the dispute.35 Under the U.N. Charter, “each
Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”36
Considering the strong language of the provision, the U.N. Charter presumes
that all parties have an international obligation to comply with the rulings of
the ICJ. The United States ratified the U.N. Charter in 1945, but the United
States Senate did not expressly allocate the “domestic responsibility for
implementing ICJ decisions.”37 Congress did delegate some power to the
President, including the power to send congressionally approved officers to
represent the United States before the ICJ and the power to appoint
representatives to the U.N.’s principal organs.38 Nonetheless, Congress’s
failure to assign responsibility to implement ICJ decisions has created
uncertainty about how to comply with the U.N. Charter domestically.

31

U.N. Charter art. 92.
Kolesnikov, supra note 10, at 187.
33
Id.
34
Joshua J. Newcomer, Messing with Texas? Why President Bush’s Memorandum Order
Trumps State Criminal Procedure, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1029, 1032–33 (2006).
35
Id. at 1033.
36
U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
37
Newcomer, supra note 34, at 1033.
38
Id. at 1033–34.
32
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III. HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. United States’ Ratification of the Vienna Convention
In 1963, at the time of the United Nations Conference on Consular
Relations, the United States had enacted bilateral treaties with twenty-eight
different countries regarding consular notification and access upon arrest of a
foreign citizen.39 Nonetheless, these treaties did not always have the
mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance.40 The United States had to
seek an alternative weapon against such ineffective bilateral treaties in order
to protect American nationals. Consequently, the United States signed the
Vienna Convention on April 24, 1963 along with the Optional Protocol.41
However, the Vienna Convention was not immediately approved by the
Senate. President Nixon wrote on May 5, 1969 urging the Senate to “give
early and favorable consideration” to the Vienna Convention.42
Subsequently, the Senate approved the Vienna Convention on October 22,
1969, and President Nixon ratified it on November 12, 1969.43 The
Convention officially entered into force for the United States on December
24, 1969.44
Despite the fact that the Convention is a binding international agreement
that was duly ratified by the United States, the United States has failed to
fully comply with its obligations. Within the last decade, the prominence of
the United States’ failure has been recognized by the international
community. The issue has stemmed from the way treaties become law in the
United States. First, for a treaty to be deemed binding upon each state in the
United States under U.S. law, the treaty provision must be self-executing or
implemented by Congress in federal legislation.45 If a treaty provision is
self-executing, it has the same authority on all states as a law implemented
by Congress. If a treaty provision is non-self-executing, the treaty provision
merely creates a U.S. obligation and is not directly enforceable on the
individual states. But, a non-self-executing treaty provision can become
domestic law through enactment of federal legislation codifying the treaty.46

39

Howell, supra note 29, at 1332.
Id.
41
Aceves, supra note 9, at 267.
42
Letter from President Richard Nixon to U.S. Senate (May 5, 1969), http://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2036.
43
Aceves, supra note 9, at 268.
44
Id. at 269.
45
Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008).
46
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §7.
40
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For decades, the Vienna Convention had been understood as selfexecuting in the United States.47 However, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided
the question about the self-execution of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
Instead, the Supreme Court held in Medellin I and Medellin II that the ICJ’s
Avena judgment (which implemented Article 36) created an international
obligation on part of the United States, but none of the relevant treaty
sources (Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, or the ICJ Statute) “creates
binding federal law in the absence of [Congress] implementing legislation.”48
In 1967, the United States did promulgate regulations in order “to establish a
uniform procedure for consular notification when nationals of foreign
countries are arrested by officers of the Department of Justice” in 28 C.F.R.
Section 50.5.49 However, these regulations only guarantee compliance by
federal officers within the Department of Justice. As it stands, the Vienna
Convention is still not enforceable at the state level.
B. The Application of the Vienna Convention in the United States
Since the United States failed to comply with its obligations under Article
36 of the Vienna Convention, three different cases have been filed against
the United States in the ICJ.50 Because the United States was a party to the
Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention, the United States had no choice
but to consent to the jurisdiction of the court. The ICJ found in all three
cases that the United States had failed to fulfill its obligations under the
Vienna Convention with respect to the consular notification and access
requirements of Article 36.51 Since the United States consistently failed to
follow the ICJ’s ruling, the ICJ took increased measures towards the United
States with each case brought before them. The ICJ first issued provisional
measures to the United States, but then it issued final, severe judgments.52
In its 2004 Avena decision, the ICJ discussed the United States’ violations
of the Vienna Convention on a larger scale than ever before. Each of the
previous cases that came before the ICJ, concerning the United States and the
47

Howell, supra note 29, at 1354.
Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 506; Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2008).
49
Aceves, supra note 9, at 273.
50
See, e.g., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31); LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
51
Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 71; Ger. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at 515; Para. v. U.S., 1998 I.C.J
at 249.
52
See Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 71–72 (holding the United States had breached Article 36
of the Vienna Convention and the Judgment should be applied to other foreign nationals
similarly situated in the United States, not only the fifty-one Mexican nationals in the case).
48
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Vienna Convention, concerned the denied right of consular access to one
individual. But, within Avena, the ICJ was asked to rule on whether the
rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals were violated by the United States’
failure to inform the detainees of their right to consular notification and
access.53 In its decision, the ICJ held Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
confers individual rights; the United States violated those rights with respect
to the fifty‐one Mexican nationals; and as a remedy for these violations, the
United States was required to provide the Mexican nationals with review and
reconsideration of their convictions.54 Additionally, the ICJ found the United
States had violated Article 36 by not informing the Mexican consulate about
its detained nationals, which prevented the consulate from providing legal
assistance.55
Since the ICJ was tired of hearing disputes brought against the United
States under the Vienna Convention, the Court in Avena decided to elaborate
on its expectations for the United States in their Judgment. For instance, the
ICJ clarified the actual meaning of “review and reconsideration,” which it
had first discussed in LaGrand. The ICJ stated that “review and
consideration” should consider the violation of the rights set forth in Article
36 of the Vienna Convention, should be of both convictions and sentences,
and should happen within the overall judicial proceedings of each specific
defendant.56 The ICJ likewise concluded that the United States’ procedural
default rule57 could not be applied in a way to prohibit the full effect of the
purpose of Article 36 and could not interfere with proper “review and
reconsideration.”58 Generally, ICJ judgments are only binding with regard to
the particular case, but the ICJ expected its Avena ruling to “apply to other
foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United
States” and not only to the fifty-one Mexican nationals whose rights were at
issue.59
After the Avena decision, it appeared that the U.S. federal government, at
least the Executive Branch, seemed ready to comply with the ICJ’s ruling.
President Bush’s actions following the Avena decision illustrated not only his
53

Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 23.
Id. at 65–66.
55
Id. at 71–72.
56
Id. at 65–66.
57
Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J.
1143, 1166 (2005) (noting “[t]he procedural default doctrine holds that a habeas petitioner
must first present his federal law argument to the state courts in compliance with state
procedural rules. . . . [and] [f]ailure to do so will bar any attempt to present that argument to
the federal courts on collateral review.”).
58
Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 57.
59
Id. at 70.
54
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frustration with the country’s failure to honor its obligations under Article 36
of the Vienna Convention but also his recognition of the importance of
complying with the consular notification and access requirements of Article
36. On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum
demanding that all fifty states give effect to the ICJ’s decision in Avena:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America, that the United States will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)
(Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give
effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in
that decision.60
The President clearly made an effort to comply with the ICJ’s order, even
though he had no power to make the order enforceable.61 President Bush
believed that he had the independent authority to implement Avena and
overrule any state-level procedural rules that might prevent “review and
reconsideration” of the fifty-one individuals named in the decision.62
Arguably, since the Avena decision stated that its ruling should “apply to
other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United
States,”63 the United States would have to comply with the “review and
reconsideration” order with more prisoners than the fifty-one Mexican
nationals. Still, it is clear that the courts of the United States could not
possibly comply with the order for every similarly situated foreign
prisoner.64 Both federal and state courts can barely handle the cases placed
on their dockets now.

60

Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the U.S. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.brownwelsh.com/Archive/2005-03-10_Avena_compliance.pdf.
61
Nancy Alexander, Comment, Saved by the States? The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Federal Government Shortcomings, and Oregon’s Rescue, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 819, 833–834 (2011). See also Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 525–26.
62
Newcomer, supra note 34, at 1038.
63
Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. at 70.
64
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS:
INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS (2011) (finding there were over
55,000 criminal aliens in the U.S. federal prison system alone in 2010 and over 296,000 in
state prison systems and local jails in 2009).
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President Bush was not alone in his efforts to get the states to comply
with the Avena ruling. The Attorney General and the Secretary of State sent
letters to the state courts, including multiple letters to the State of Texas,
urging the courts to comply and provide “review and reconsideration.”65 The
U.S. government also filed amicus briefs and orchestrated “high level
diplomatic discussions to find alternative approaches for ‘review and
reconsideration’ ” in the alternative.66 As noted by several scholars, “these
actions show that the United States recognized the importance of compliance
with the judgment to ‘smooth out U.S. relations with Mexico,’ help repair
U.S. international integrity with respect to Article 36, and to encourage
compliance with respect to U.S. citizens abroad.”67
Despite these measures to support the Avena decision, on March 7, 2005,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent a letter to the U.N. to inform it that
the United States had formally withdrawn from the Optional Protocol.68 “As
a consequence of this withdrawal,” Secretary Rice wrote, “the United States
will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
reflected in that Protocol.”69 The international community interpreted the
letter as an immediate withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, which brought
forth concerns about the United States’ commitment to its reciprocal,
international obligations that the Protocol embodied.70 The State Department
elaborated that “the administration was troubled by foreign interference in
the domestic capital system but intended to fulfill its obligations under
international law.”71 This statement did not curtail the international criticism
that followed.
C. The Supreme Court and the Vienna Convention
Meanwhile, a case concerning Jose Ernesto Medellin, one of the Mexican
nationals from the Avena decision, was making its way to the U.S. Supreme
65
Scott W. Lyons, Symposium: Treaties and Domestic Law after Medellín v. Texas:
Breach Without Remedy in the International Forum and the Need for Self-help: The
Conundrum Resulting from the Medellín Case, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 73, 83 (2009).
66
Id.
67
Alexander, supra note 61, at 833. See also Lyons, supra note 65, at 83 (noting multiple
U.S. actions that reflected a determination to remedy the U.S.’s breach of the VCCR).
68
Howell, supra note 29, at 1352.
69
Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Sec’y-Gen. of the
U.N. (Mar. 7, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87288.pdf.
70
See generally Charles Lane, Editorial, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A01; Howell, supra note 29, at 1353–54.
71
Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/politics/us-says-it-has-withdrawn-from-world
-judicial-body.html.
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Court. But before Medellin’s case, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, “issued
after Avena but involving individuals who were not named in the Avena
judgment,” the Supreme Court held “that, contrary to the ICJ’s
determination, the Vienna Convention did not preclude the application of
state default rules.”72 Therefore, the entire international community was on
edge, questioning whether the U.S. Supreme Court would make an exception
to its previous ruling for the fifty-one nationals involved in the Avena
decision. The Medellin case helped to answer this question.
Jose Ernesto Medellin was convicted for capital murder and sentenced to
death by a Texas state court for the gang rape and massacre of two teenagers.
After his sentence, in his first application for state post-conviction relief,
Medellin raised a claim based on the violation of his rights under the Vienna
Convention. The state court rejected the claim on two bases: the claim was
procedurally defaulted because Medellin had failed to raise it earlier and the
claim failed to show any prejudice arising from the violation.73 Medellin’s
habeas corpus petition in the federal district court was denied on the same
grounds. The Fifth Circuit also denied a certificate of appealability.74 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that there are no individually enforceable rights
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.75 Even though the ICJ ruled in
LaGrand, and reiterated in Avena, that procedural default rules could not bar
a petitioner’s claim, the Fifth Circuit held that it could “not disregard the
Supreme Court’s clear holding that ordinary procedural default rules can bar
Vienna Convention claims.”76
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.77 Before oral
argument could occur, the President issued his memorandum, discussed
above, so Medellin filed another application for relief in Texas state court.78
Since the Supreme Court believed that Medellin may be provided with the
review and reconsideration he requested within the state court system, and
because his federal relief claim may have otherwise been barred, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari.79 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals subsequently dismissed Medellin’s second application for
relief.80 The Texas court held that neither the Avena decision nor the
President’s memorandum constituted binding federal law that could serve as
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
Id. at 502–03.
Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 280.
Id.
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005).
Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 503.
Medellin, 544 U.S. at 664.
Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W. 3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
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a legal basis for Medellin’s second writ.81 As a result, the Supreme Court
again granted certiorari.82
Ultimately, in Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court had two fundamental
questions to answer. First, the Supreme Court needed to decide whether the
“ICJ’s judgment in Avena [is] directly enforceable as domestic law in a state
court in the United States.”83 Second, the Supreme Court had to decide
whether the “President’s Memorandum independently require[s] the States to
provide review and reconsideration of the claims of the fifty-one Mexican
nationals named in Avena without regard to state procedural default rules.”84
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for the Court.
The Supreme Court first analyzed Medellin’s argument that the Optional
Protocol, U.N. Charter, and ICJ Statute together constituted relevant
authority to give the Avena judgment binding effect on all domestic courts in
the United States.85 The Optional Protocol, as previously noted, is merely a
bare grant of jurisdiction to the ICJ, and the treaty is silent about the effect of
an ICJ decision.86 Instead, the U.N. Charter provides the mechanism for
compliance with ICJ decisions in Article 94.87 As a result, the Supreme
Court found that the U.N. Charter did not “contemplate the automatic
enforceability of ICJ decisions in domestic courts.”88 Additionally, the
Supreme Court noted that the ICJ Statute itself provided further confirmation
for its finding.89 Ultimately, the Avena decision creates an international
obligation on the part of the United States, but it does not of its own force
constitute binding federal law.
The Supreme Court then analyzed whether the ICJ’s judgment in Avena is
binding on state courts by virtue of President Bush’s February 28, 2005
81

Id.
Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 504.
83
Id. at 498.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 506–14.
86
Id. at 507–08. Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that “[e]ach Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a
party.” (emphasis added). U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1.
87
Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 508. Article 94(2) provides,
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the
Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations
or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 2.
88
Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 509.
89
Id. at 511. Article 59 of the statute states that “[t]he decision of the [ICJ] has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” (emphasis added).
Medellin cannot be considered a party to the Avena decision since the ICJ decides disputes
between nations only.
82
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Memorandum. Arguably, since the President acted pursuant to his powers
authorized by the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter acquiesced by
Congress, the President had the authority to implement the Avena
judgment.90 The Court disagreed, relying on the text of the U.S. Constitution
which gives Congress the power to make laws and not the President.91
Further, since the treaties were ratified as non-self-executing, the President
could not unilaterally make them self-executing.92 The Court also found that
the Executive’s power to settle international disputes does not extend as far
as the unprecedented directive in President Bush’s Memorandum, which
affected state’s police powers.93 And the President could not rely on his
Take Care power in the Constitution since the Avena decision is not domestic
law.94 In sum, the Supreme Court concluded 6–3 that neither Avena nor the
President’s Memorandum constituted directly enforceable federal law that
would pre-empt state limitations on filing of successive habeas petitions.95
Justice Breyer wrote the sole dissenting opinion of Medellin I, joined by
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, in which he used a seven-step test to show
why “the United States’ treaty obligation to comply with the ICJ judgment in
Avena is enforceable in [domestic] court[s].”96 First, Justice Breyer attacked
the majority’s emphasis on the phrase “undertakes to comply” as proof that
ICJ decisions are not self-executing.97 The majority looked at precedent
where the Court previously found treaty provisions self-executing, but they
could not find any clear language.98 Justice Breyer argued that the majority
did not find such plain language because many of the treaties ratified by the
United States must allow different nations to implement the treaties by their
own practice.99 Not all countries have the convenience the Supremacy
Clause provides to the United States.100

90

Id. at 525.
Id. at 526. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
92
Medellin I, 552 U.S. at 527. By definition, non-self-executing treaties do not have
domestic effect of their own force.
93
Id. at 532.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 498–99.
96
Id. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 551.
98
Id. at 547–48.
99
Id. at 548.
100
Id. For example, Britain takes “the view that the British Crown makes treaties but
Parliament makes domestic law, [which] virtually always requires parliamentary legislation.”
By contrast, the Netherlands, like the United States, “directly incorporates many treaties
concluded by the executive into its domestic law even without explicit parliamentary approval
of the treaty.”
91
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Thus, in Justice Breyer’s opinion, the relevant treaties (i.e., U.N. Charter,
Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute) suggest that the drafters intended for ICJ
decisions to be automatically enforceable in domestic courts.101 The
Optional Protocol gives compulsory jurisdiction over Vienna Convention
disputes to the ICJ, whose proceedings are binding.102 The United States has
ratified seventy treaties with similar ICJ dispute resolution provisions and
has interpreted those treaties as self-executing.103 There is no reason to treat
the Optional Protocol provisions differently.104 Further, Justice Breyer
argues that enforcement of the Avena decision is best suited for courts
experienced in criminal law and procedures rather than by legislative
enactment.105 Finally, President Bush favored direct judicial enforcement,
and Congress had expressed no reservation to it.106 Therefore, since the
treaty is self-executing, the Avena ruling should be enforceable in domestic
courts without congressional action per the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.
Unfortunately for Medellin, Justice Breyer was on the losing side of this
decision, but Medellin was not going to give up easily. On his scheduled
execution day, Medellin again brought his case before the U.S. Supreme
Court to ask for a stay of execution. He based his case on the theory that
either Congress or the Texas state legislature might implement the ICJ’s
decision that violations of the Vienna Convention are grounds for
reconsideration and review.107 Neither the President nor the Texas governor
had represented to the Supreme Court that legislative action was likely.
Congress had not progressed past the introduction of a bill in the four years
since the Avena decision and four months since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Medellin I.108 Thus, the Supreme Court determined that the
possibilities Medellin relied on were “too remote to justify an order” to stay
“the sentence imposed by the Texas courts.”109 Additionally, Medellin did
not have the necessary ground to ask for a stay of execution because he
failed to prove that his conviction was obtained unlawfully.110 Ultimately,

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 551.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 541–42.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 538–39.
Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II) 554 U.S. 759, 759 (2008).
Id. at 759–60.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 760.
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the state of Texas proceeded with the execution, and Medellin was
pronounced dead by lethal injection at 9:57 p.m. on August 5, 2008.111
More recently in Garcia v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court case ruled on
U.S. violations of the Vienna Convention.112 Humberto Leal Garcia, another
Mexican national named in the Avena decision, was convicted and sentenced
to death by a Texas court.113 After multiple failed petitions and requests for
relief in both state and federal courts, Garcia sought a stay of execution from
the Supreme Court in order to allow Congress time to enact legislation
implementing the Avena decision.114 However, “the Supreme Court justices
split 5–4 along conservative-liberal lines in denying a stay of execution.”115
In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court first disposed of Garcia’s
due process claim that Texas could not execute him while proposed
legislation was under consideration.116 Next, the Court rejected the
government’s argument that Garcia’s stay of execution should be granted in
support of future jurisdiction which would arise once the impending
legislation was enacted.117 The Court highlighted, “[o]ur task is to rule on
what the law is, not what it might eventually be.”118 But, even if the Court
could issue a stay on the basis of unenacted legislation, Garcia’s case would
not be the appropriate vehicle.119 The Court, alluding to its statement in
Medellin II, noted that Congress obviously did not view legislation
implementing the Vienna Convention as a priority.120 Additionally, the
government refused to concede that Garcia had been prejudiced from his lack
of consular access, which, as noted, is a prerequisite for any stay of
execution.121 Accordingly, Garcia was executed and pronounced dead at
7:21 p.m. on July 7, 2011.122

111

Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of Houston Teens,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Medellin
-executed-for-rape-murder-of-Houston-1770696.php.
112
Garcia v. Texas, 564 U.S. 940 (2011).
113
See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 25
(Mar. 31).
114
Garcia, 564 U.S. at 940–41.
115
Bill Mears, Mexican National Executed in Texas, CNN (July 7, 2011), http://www.cnn.
com/2011/CRIME/07/07/texas.mexican.execution/.
116
Garcia, 564 U.S. at 942.
117
Id. at 941.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 942.
120
Id. At the time of this opinion, it had been seven years since Avena’s decision and three
years since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Medellin I.
121
Id. at 942–43.
122
Mears, supra note 115.
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Again, Justice Breyer authored the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, which adopted the government’s position
that permitting Texas to execute Garcia amounted to a breach of the United
States’ international obligations.123 Like the previous administration,
President Obama failed to urge the Court to delay Garcia’s execution.124
After the decision, Sandra Babcock, the lead appellate attorney expressed her
concern with the United States’ inaction.125 She emphasized, “[t]he
execution of Mr. Leal [Garcia] violates the United States’ treaty
commitments, threatens the nation's foreign policy interests, and undermines
the safety of all Americans abroad.”126 Today, her words still ring truthfully
for the United States’ predicament.
IV. PAST PROPOSALS
A. Failed Attempts at Legislative Reform
Even though the Supreme Court ruled that the Avena decision and the
President’s Memorandum did not constitute enforceable law on the states, it
noted that “Congress could elect to give [the Vienna Convention] wholesale
effect . . . through implementing legislation, as it regularly has” with other
non-self-executing treaties.127 As a result, three different bills have been
proposed in order to bring the United States into compliance with its
obligations under the Vienna Convention. Alas, none of the bills have
managed to pass congressional approval.
First, the Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008 (Avena Act) was
introduced on July 14, 2008 by Howard Berman (D-CA) and Zoe Lofgren
(D-CA).128 The Avena Act was in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Medellin I. The Avena Act sought “[t]o create a civil action to provide
judicial remedies to carry out certain treaty obligations of the United States”
under the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol.129 It provided that
“any person whose rights are infringed by a violation by any nonforeign
governmental authority of [A]rticle 36 of the Vienna Convention” may

123

Garcia v. Texas, 564 U.S. 940, 943–44 (2011).
Mears, supra note 115.
125
Id. Sandra said, “The need for congressional action to restore our reputation and protect
our citizens is more urgent than ever.”
126
Id.
127
Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 520 (2008).
128
Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008), https://www.
congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/6481/text.
129
Id.
124
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obtain relief by civil action.130 In section 2(b), the Avena Act further defined
appropriate relief as:
any declaratory or equitable relief necessary to secure the
rights; and . . . in any case where the plaintiff is convicted of a
criminal offense where the violation occurs during and in
relation to the investigation or prosecution of that offense, any
relief required to remedy the harm done by the violation,
including the vitiation of the conviction or sentence where
appropriate.131
The Avena Act would have applied to past violations.132 However, it never
made it out of the House Committee of the Judiciary.
On June 14, 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) renewed the effort to
bring the United States into compliance with the Vienna Convention by
introducing the Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011 (CNCA).133
The CNCA was considerably more detailed than the failed Avena Act.134
After its introduction, Senator Leahy received such favorable support that he
announced on June 29, 2011 that he planned to hold a hearing on the bill in
July.135 The CNCA’s stated purpose was “[t]o facilitate compliance with
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna
April 24, 1963, and for other purposes.”136 Essentially, the CNCA directly
incorporated the language of Article 36 into legislation by reaffirming that
the obligations under the Vienna Convention are federal law and apply to all
foreign nationals arrested or detained in the United States.137 Further, the
130

Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 2(b).
132
Id. § 2(c).
133
157 CONG. REC. S3779 (daily ed. June 14, 2011) (introducing the CNCA legislation and
letters of support); see also Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senate, Leahy Renews Effort
To Bring U.S. Into Compliance With International Consular Notification Treaty (June 14,
2011), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-renews-effort-to-bring-us-into-compliance-w
ith-international-consular-notification-treaty [hereinafter Leahy CNCA Press Release].
134
Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011), https://www.
congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/1194?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.+119
4%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=3.
135
157 CONG. REC. S4215 (daily ed. June 29, 2011) (noting “favorable commentary the bill
has generated, including multiple editorials in major newspapers and numerous letters of
support from across the political spectrum”).
136
S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011).
137
See id. § 3(a). Section 3(a) provides,
[I]f an individual who is not a national of the United States is detained or
arrested by an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a State or
local government, the arresting or detaining officer or employee, or other
131
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CNCA provided limited post-conviction relief by giving federal courts the
jurisdiction “to review cases of foreign nationals currently on death row in
the United States, who did not receive consular access.”138 But, in order for
those foreign nationals to obtain relief, they would have to establish not only
a violation of their consular notification rights but also that the violation
resulted in “actual prejudice.”139 Senator Leahy adequately summarized the
bill’s three main purposes as protecting American citizens abroad, fulfilling
the United States’ legal obligations, and removing an impediment to
cooperation with international allies.140 The CNCA was not a perfect
solution for bringing the United States into complete compliance with the
Vienna Convention, but it was a step in the right direction.
Without a doubt, the CNCA had numerous supporters and was given
much more consideration than the Avena Act.141 The CNCA is the only
proposed legislation concerning the Vienna Convention that had a hearing on
its contents, which occurred on July 27, 2011. Senator Leahy had multiple,
qualified witnesses testify on behalf of the CNCA at the hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.142 The witnesses stressed how continued
failure to give effect to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in the United
States would invite foreign nations to reciprocate by disregarding the rights
of U.S. citizens arrested or detained in their countries.
One witness, however, spoke in opposition to the legislation at the
hearing. The witness argued that the CNCA raised constitutional issues
which weighed against its enactment.143 In his view, enactment of the
CNCA would not be within Congress’ power under the Constitution. The
federal government has certain enumerated powers and the rest are left to the
states. The witness argued that the CNCA encroached on the states’ police
powers by commandeering state officials to carry out federal obligations.144
The witness did not disagree that the policies the bill promoted were
appropriate officer or employee of the Federal Government or a State or local
government, shall notify that individual without delay that the individual may
request that the consulate of the foreign state of which the individual is a
national be notified of the detention or arrest.
138
Leahy CNCA Press Release, supra note 133; see S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2011).
139
S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2011).
140
157 CONG. REC. S4216 (daily ed. June 29, 2011).
141
See generally Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad:
Hearing on S. 1194 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter
Hearings].
142
Id. at 5–31. The witnesses included two esteemed lawyers, a freelance journalist, the
Under Secretary for Management, and the Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
143
Id. at 24.
144
Id. at 25 (noting “[t]hese limitations are plain and well described in Supreme Court case
law, including such seminal cases as New York v. United States and Printz v. United States”).
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worthwhile; he merely felt that its constitutional concerns took precedent
over its passing.
Nonetheless, the CNCA had widespread support.
The Obama
Administration supported the legislation, along with the Department of
Justice, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the Department of State.145 Multiple letters, articles, and statements
from different entities were attached to the end of the hearing record in order
to convey further support for the proposed legislation. Despite the
overwhelming amount of support, the CNCA never reported out into the
Senate for a vote.
On May 24, 2012, Senator Leahy attempted a different approach to bring
the United States into compliance with the Vienna Convention. He placed
the relevant provision into the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2013 (S. 3241).146 As
usual, the media had moved on to the next topic, but Senator Leahy had not
yet given up on bringing the United States into compliance with the Vienna
Convention. Section 7090 of S. 3241 was very similar to the CNCA, but it
was not identical. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s Report on the bill
noted the key differences from the CNCA. For example, Section 7090
omitted Section 3 of the CNCA, “which set forth practical guidance for
compliance with U.S. consular notification and access obligations.”147 The
Committee felt the section was unnecessary since the Vienna Convention is
self-executing, and it wanted to encourage the work already being done by
the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and
the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).148 The Committee also added several
provisions which were absent from the CNCA. Section 7090 described the
effect of prior adjudication149 and gave the federal courts a timeline to render
145

Leahy CNCA Press Release, supra note 133.
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
Fiscal Year 2013, S. 3241, 112th Cong. § 7090 (2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112thcongress/senate-bill/3241/text.
147
S. REP. NO. 112-72, at 68–69 (2012), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112srpt172/
pdf/CRPT-112srpt172.pdf.
148
Id. at 69. The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure was
working on updating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to facilitate compliance with
consular notification and access requirements. The ULC promotes uniformity of law among
the several states in the U.S. on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable.
Thus, the ULC was trying to create model legislation implementing the consular notification
requirements as well.
149
Id.; see also S. 3241, 112th Cong. § 7090(a)(3)(B) (2012) (noting “[a] petition for review
under this subsection shall not be granted if the claimed violation . . . has previously been
adjudicated . . . unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination”).
146
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a judgment.150 It also clarified that a federal court could refer a petition for
review to a federal magistrate.151
The key difference between the CNCA and Section 7090 of S. 3241 was
the manner in which a foreign defendant could request review of his or her
conviction. As noted by Senator Leahy, the CNCA would permit “foreign
nationals who have been convicted and sentenced to death to ask a court to
review their cases and determine if the failure to provide consular
notification led to an unfair conviction or sentence.”152 On the other hand,
Section 7090 of S. 3241 required a petition to make an initial showing before
the case could even qualify for review.153 Both bills still required the foreign
defendant to make a showing of “actual prejudice” in order to obtain relief.154
Like other efforts to bring the United States into compliance with the Vienna
Convention, Section 7090 of S. 3241 did not receive congressional approval.
In 2013, Congress continued to consider legislation that would facilitate
compliance with the Avena ruling. The previous failed legislation, S. 3241
Section 7090, was placed into a Senate Appropriations Act.155 The House
rejected the Senate provision, and a related House bill became public law
instead on January 17, 2014, without any provisions concerning the Vienna
Convention.156
Senator Leahy’s most recent attempt to bring the United States into
compliance with the Vienna Convention was a bill he introduced on June 19,
2014.157 With this attempt, Senator Leahy tried a third time to place the
relevant provision into an appropriations act.158 Nevertheless, the relevant

150

S. 3241, 112th Cong. § 7090(a)(3)(E) (2012) (giving the Federal Court one year to render
a final determination and issue a final judgment after the date on which a petition was filed).
151
Id. § 7090(a)(5).
152
157 CONG. REC. S3779 (daily ed. June 14, 2011).
153
S. 3241, 112th Cong. § 7090(a)(3)(A) (2012) (explaining that a petition must show a
violation occurred and if the violation had not occurred, the individual’s consulate would have
provided assistance to him).
154
See S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2011); S. 3241, 112th Cong. § 7090(a)(3)(a) (2012).
155
CONSULAR AND JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND RELATED ISSUES, 2013 DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 2, § A(1) at 26; see also Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2014, S. 1372,
113th Cong. § 7083 (2013), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1372?q
=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.+1372%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=2.
156
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5
(2014).
157
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2015, S. 2499, 113th Cong. § 7085 (2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/sen
ate-bill/2499.
158
Id.
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section did not become law.159 The House rejected the Senate provision, and
a related House bill was enacted instead on December 16, 2014, without any
provisions concerning the Vienna Convention.160 Progress, however, was
made towards bringing the United States into compliance with its consular
notification and access obligations this legislative session through an update
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.161 The new Rules took effect on
December 1, 2014, and require a federal magistrate judge to inform a foreign
defendant charged with a federal crime at his or her initial appearance that he
or she “may request that an attorney for the government or a federal law
enforcement official notify a consular officer from the defendant’s country of
nationality that the defendant has been arrested. . . .”162 The advisory
committee on this amendment noted that the arresting officers still have the
primary responsibility to notify a defendant’s consulate upon notice from the
defendant, but this addition was to serve as “additional assurance that U.S.
treaty obligations are fulfilled, and to create a judicial record of that
action.”163 Although a step in the right direction, the amendment does not
reduce the need for legislation which would bring the nation into full
compliance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. And, regrettably, the
United States currently has no passed (or pending) legislation towards that
goal.
Why has every attempt at implementing the Vienna Convention failed at
the federal level? None of the proposed legislation since the first attempt to
place a Vienna Convention provision in an appropriations bill has had any
documented discussion. It can be inferred from the lack of debate that such
efforts have failed for a variety of reasons. One possibility is the lack of
media attention towards the topic since Medellin I. Despite the production of
shows like “Locked Up Abroad,” the American public has viewed the issue
with apathy. Another possibility could be the jarring nature of politics. The
United States’ non-compliance with the Vienna Convention was brought to
light by cases involving the death penalty, a topic which has a clear, divisive
line between liberals and conservatives. Both sides seem to view
159

Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senate, Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy on the
Omnibus Appropriations Bill (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statementof-senator-patrick-leahy-on-the-omnibus-appropriations-bill1.
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Id.; see also Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2015,
Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014).
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See generally Press Release, Marie Harf, Deputy Department Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t
of State Office of the Spokesperson, Updates to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Facilitate Compliance with Consular Notification and Access Obligations (Dec. 2, 2014),
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FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2)(H).
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Id. at advisory committee’s note on 2014 amendments.
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implementation of the Vienna Convention as an affirmative step towards
dismantling the death penalty. Even though it is not necessarily the truth, the
concern definitely hovers over Vienna Convention legislation. This
combination of little media attention and discord among political parties
makes passing legislation extremely difficult.
B. Various Proposals for Compliance
Considering the United States has been in violation of Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention for at least twelve years, scholars have developed an
array of approaches to improve America’s compliance with consular
notification and access, but none have been adopted. Before Avena and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin I, William Aceves recognized the
consequences if the United States failed to improve its compliance under the
Vienna Convention. As a result, he made several recommendations.164
Aceves suggested the United States increase its monitoring with federal
agencies through the State Department, cooperate with foreign governments
to develop procedures to improve compliance, and induce law enforcement
agencies to identify foreign nationals shortly after detention.165 He also
suggested Congress enact legislation to allow foreign governments to sue in
federal courts for treaty violations, or in the alternative, the U.S. federal
government should sue on behalf of foreign governments to challenge treaty
violations.166
Aveces’ recommendations were based on a sense of reciprocity, but these
suggestions do not create mandatory regulations for state or federal agencies.
For example, the U.S. State Department has prepared and circulated training
materials throughout the nation to inform local law enforcement agencies
about the Vienna Convention. U.S. State Department experts even travel
around the country to provide in-person training on consular notification and
access. Recently, in August 2016, the State Department released its fourth
edition of Consular Notification and Access.167 In 2009, the U.S. State
Department sent 200,000 consular notification and training materials to law
enforcement agencies across the United States.168 But since the State
Department cannot ensure the training is undertaken or followed, violations
164

Aceves, supra note 9, at 313.
Id. at 314–16.
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See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS (4th ed. 2016), https://
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Consular and Judicial Assistance and Related Issues, 2010 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
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continue to occur. Alternatively, it would be very difficult for Congress to
allow foreign governments access to U.S. courts through legislation since the
Supreme Court has continually reiterated that U.S. states are immune from
suit under the Eleventh Amendment.169 It would be impractical for the U.S.
government to sue on behalf of other nations for all state and local violations
of the Vienna Convention; the U.S. has enough cases to handle own its own.
After the Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008 failed, Edward Duffy
argued that the “federal government could use the Spending Power to fashion
conditional grants to the states, contingent on their satisfaction of Vienna
Convention obligations.”170 He viewed this option as the most viable
considering the constraints placed on the federal government through both
the Constitution and political processes.171 Nevertheless, Duffy’s solution is
not the most ideal. It would require an incentive for Congressional officials
to encourage states to comply. As of now, it does not appear that such an
incentive actually exists.172 The United States has been criticized by the ICJ
for its Vienna Convention violations, and since its withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol, the United States has consistently received criticism from
the international community for its ongoing failure to comply with its legal
obligations. This failure places U.S. citizens at risk when traveling abroad,
because other nations are less likely to honor their obligations under the
Vienna Convention when the United States fails to provide consular
notification and access to foreign nationals. Despite this risk, the majority of
states have not complied on their own accord. There is no stronger incentive
that could arise than protecting the lives’ of U.S. citizens.
In 2013, Nicole Howell proposed the “United States seek bilateral
modification of the Vienna Convention to limit its application to noncitizen
capital offenses and exclude the minor offenses that make U.S. compliance
with Article 36 unrealistic.”173 Bilateral modification of an international
treaty can occur when two or more countries agree to modify the terms of the
treaty as between themselves alone. Modification of the Vienna Convention
is allowed and governed by Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, which describes how Parties to a multilateral treaty may modify
the treaty’s terms.174 Howell stresses that the United States could prioritize
the modification with those countries whose citizens are incarcerated most
169

See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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Id. at 1368.
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often in the United States like Mexico and China.175 Her solution would
place a considerably lighter burden on U.S. law enforcement officials,
especially since she proposes that a second responsible party be created to
provide consular notification, such as defense counsel or judges.176
Even though the Vienna Convention may be modified, Howell’s
suggestion would not solve the issue, but rather complicate matters further.
The U.S. parties responsible for giving consular notification could change
depending on each bilateral agreement, and each bilateral agreement could
alter the parties’ obligations. Such agreements would create more confusion
than a uniform application of the Vienna Convention for all foreign
criminals. Plus, as Howell acknowledged, modification of a treaty requires
advice and consent by the Senate.177 The international community wants the
United States to comply with their Vienna Convention obligations; thus,
many countries would likely seek such modification. However, the Senate
would be unenthusiastic about approving so many bilateral agreements since
it already ratified the Vienna Convention. Finally, Howell’s proposal does
not address the main problem: how to ensure that every state in the United
States follows the obligations under the Vienna Convention or her suggested
bilateral agreements. For these reasons, Howell’s proposal is not a viable
solution.
The most basic proposal, as made by Justice Breyer in his dissent in
Medellin I, is that the treaty obligation to comply with the Avena ICJ
judgment is self-executing and part of federal law.178 If so, Avena should be
enforceable in domestic courts without further congressional action.179
Although Supreme Court decisions are not easily overturned and lower
courts have an obligation to follow their holdings, states can choose to view
the United States treaty obligations as self-executing or pass legislation that
reflects this interpretation.
Interpreting the consular notification
requirements of the Vienna Convention as self-executing would provide an
individual cause of action for foreign nationals arrested or detained in the
United States.
C. Individual U.S. States’ Attempts at Compliance
As of now, four states have enacted legislation to ensure compliance with
the Vienna Convention within their jurisdiction. California led the way in
175
176
177
178
179

Howell, supra note 29, at 1375.
Id. at 1377–78.
U.S. CONST. art. 2, cl. 2.
Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
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1999 after the first wave of Vienna Convention litigation. The statute
provides that, “every peace officer, upon arrest and booking or detention for
more than two hours of a known or suspected foreign national, shall advise
the foreign national that he or she has a right to communicate with an official
from the consulate of his or her country.”180 Nonetheless, it is unclear
whether a violation of the statute would have any real impact on the outcome
of a case. In Oregon, law enforcement officials who detain a foreigner on
grounds of mental illness are required to “inform the person of the person’s
right to communicate with an official from the consulate of the person’s
country.”181 No similar provision exists for criminal arrests, except for a
general duty of police officers to understand the rights of foreign nationals
provided by the Vienna Convention.182 Yet, the statute imposes no penalty
for officers who fail to comply.
Florida was the third state to enact this type of legislation. In its current
form since 2004, Florida’s statute requires the state protocol officer to
“[e]stablish a system of communication to provide all state and local law
enforcement agencies with information regarding proper procedures relating
to the arrest or incarceration of a foreign citizen.”183 In another statute,
Florida clarifies that “[f]ailure to provide consular notification . . . shall not
be a defense in any criminal proceeding against any foreign national and
shall not be cause for the foreign national’s discharge from custody.”184
Illinois is the most recent state to enact legislation to better implement
consular notification and access. The law clarified who was responsible in
the Illinois criminal justice system for providing consular notice to arrested
or detained foreigners, when such notice must be given, and what happens if
notice was not given.185 But like the other state legislations, the Illinois law
failed to create any new right or remedy.
The California, Florida, Illinois, and Oregon legislatures have good
intentions for encouraging compliance with the Vienna Convention, but their
efforts are likely in vain. If the President of the United States, the Supreme
Court, and the international community cannot encourage local law
enforcement to comply with the Vienna Convention, state statutes that
provide no repercussion for non-compliance or remedy for foreign nationals
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whose rights have been violated will have no force. As previously noted, the
only way to bring the United States into compliance with the Vienna
Convention is to actually implement legislation which will force law
enforcement officials to provide foreign nationals with consular notification
and access. Legislation would be best implemented at the national level in
order to assure uniform compliance across the nation, but state legislation
could be helpful. However, the state legislation needs to have some type of
enforcement mechanism. Codified encouragements will not be successful;
such laws are just symbolic and merely persuade instead of enforce, punish,
or prevent.
V. A WORKABLE SOLUTION
The most efficient way to bring the entire United States into compliance
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is through federal legislation.
Federal legislation implementing the Vienna Convention would ensure that
every state follows the obligations the United States agreed to when it signed
the treaty in 1963. With the increase of Americans traveling abroad, it is
time that the political parties place their differences aside to create adequate
legislation to afford foreign criminals consular notification and access. The
safety of Americans abroad depends on other nations’ reciprocity, which will
be nonexistent if the U.S. government does not force compliance with the
Vienna Convention.
Apart from political arguments, the only potential argument against
codifying the Vienna Convention is that such legislation may be
unconstitutional. The U.S. federal government has particular enumerated
powers. The rest of the powers are residual powers left to the states to police
the health, wealth, and morals of its citizens.186 In Printz, the U.S. Supreme
Court analyzed the history and federalist structure of the Constitution and
found two specific limits on the federal government’s necessary and proper
power in regards to infringing on state sovereignty.187 The Court held that
one, the federal government could not make a state enact law and
regulations, and two, the federal government could not require a state officer
to implement federal law without the state’s consent.188
Arguably, legislation implementing the Vienna Convention could be
viewed as commandeering state officials to enforce federal law, but there is a
key distinction between this legislation and the law at issue in Printz. In
Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, treaties made under the
186
187
188
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Id. at 935.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/18/2018 9:01 AM

COMPLYING WITH VIENNA CONVENTION POST-MEDELLIN

475

authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land.189 It would
logically follow that federal legislation executing a treaty would be
enforceable on the states. Such legislation would not encroach on the states’
police powers since the states agreed to the treaty’s conditions upon its
ratification. In other words, the states implicitly consented to having their
state law enforcement officers implement the scheme of the Vienna
Convention when it was signed into law under the authority of the United
States. Additionally, in Medellin I, the Supreme Court held the Avena
judgment created an international obligation on part of the United States, but
none of the relevant treaty sources (Optional Protocol, the UN Charter, or the
ICJ Statute) “create binding federal law in the absence of Congressional
implementing legislation.”190 Thus, the Supreme Court left open the option
for Congress to pass legislation to make the Avena judgment implementing
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention binding federal law. Therefore, if
Congress decides to pass a law implementing the Vienna Convention, it
appears that the Supreme Court would uphold such a law as constitutional.
Congress thus far has not been able to create a comprehensible piece of
legislation capable of passing both Houses. The Avena Act, the first law in
response to Avena, only created a civil action for foreign defendants who had
their consular notification and access rights violated.191 Since the law did not
provide an adequate remedy for foreign criminal defendants, it inevitably
failed to pass legislation implementing the Vienna Convention. Plus, the
law’s function seemed to be unprecedented in the criminal context. For
instance, if an officer has violated a defendant’s Miranda rights, the
prosecutor cannot use, for most purposes, anything the suspect says as
evidence against the suspect at trial. The defendant does not have to seek a
civil remedy for the violation of his Miranda rights. The Avena Act would
have applied to past violations as well.192 While this type of application
would be ideal, its chance of passing into law is slim. Legislatures would
receive political backlash for flooding the courts with criminal defendants.
Thus, despite this moral failure to amend past wrongs, legislation would be
more likely to pass both the House and the Senate if it applied only to cases
after the law was ratified. Considering these flaws, without any discussion
or debate on the matter, the Avena Act failed to exit the House Committee of
the Judiciary.
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The CNCA, introduced by Senator Leahy, was the second law attempting
to implement Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.193 This law did a good
job of incorporating the specific language of the treaty into legislation. The
statute also provided limited relief to defendants on death row if they could
prove that the violation of their Article 36 rights resulted in prejudice.194 Of
all the past proposed legislation, the CNCA was the closest to directly
implementing the Vienna Convention and the ICJ’s Avena decision. Avena
required the United States to provide review and reconsideration for fifty-one
Mexican nationals on death row and held that it expected the United States to
provide such a remedy to foreign defendants similarly situated.195 This
legislation was not a direct application of Avena since it required the
defendants to show that the violation resulted in actual prejudice before they
could obtain relief. The CNCA also placed more limitations on who could
seek relief since a defendant’s habeas petition had to be filed within one year
of the statute’s enactment or on the date the government’s impediment to
filing the petition was removed, whichever was later in time.196 Unlike the
Avena Act, this statute did not apply retroactively.197
Despite the positives of the CNCA, this act never reported out into the
Senate for a vote. This piece of legislation accommodated both sides of the
political aisle. It called for consular notification and access to be given to all
foreign detainees; yet, for violations it limited the relief to death row
defendants and further limited the time-frame available for relief. It
appeared to be an adequate compromise.198 It is possible that the legislation
failed to go for a vote due to outside circumstances. Leal Garcia, a foreign
defendant who was convicted of kidnapping, raping, and killing a teenage
girl, sought a stay of execution on account of the violation of his rights under
the Vienna Convention.199 The stay was denied by the Supreme Court on
July 7, 2011, in a 5–4 decision across conservative-liberal lines.200 The
hearing on the CNCA was held twenty days later.201 After such a politically
and emotionally charged case, it is not surprising that the CNCA failed to go
for a vote. Conservative constituents likely viewed such legislation as unjust
for allowing violent criminals relief based on what they perceived to be mere
193
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technicalities. As a result, the legislation failed and Senator Leahy had to try
a different route.
One year later, suitable legislation was placed into the Senate
appropriations act.202 The provision was basically the CNCA with some
revisions. As noted above, the provision set aside the Vienna Convention
definition since the committee viewed the Vienna Convention as selfexecuting.203 The provision additionally described the effect of prior
adjudication, allowed federal courts one year to respond to petitions, allowed
cases to be referred to federal magistrates, and required defendants to make
an initial showing to qualify for review.204 The revisions were likely made in
response to criticisms of the CNCA, but as noted, there is no documented
discussion of this provision. The alterations to the CNCA restricted a
defendant’s ability to petition for review even further by requiring an initial
showing, but it also demanded the cases be handled within a specific time.
The one-year limitation seems short considering the number of cases already
on the federal docket, but it reiterates that review of these cases should be top
priority. Nonetheless, this provision also failed to pass into law. It was too
restrictive on the number of foreign defendants who could receive relief, and
it demanded an implausible time line for review.
In 2013, the exact legislation was again placed in the Senate’s
appropriations bill, but the House removed the provision.205 In 2014, the
same thing occurred; the provision was placed in the Senate’s appropriations
bill and rejected by the House.206 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
however, were updated in 2014 to aid in the nation’s cause for bringing the
United States into full compliance with its international obligations.207 The
changes to the Rules were relieving for those who have been pushing for
compliance for over a decade, but those amendments were not enough. They
only ensured a foreign defendant is notified of his right to contact his
consulate if he appears before a federal magistrate judge. Such notification
is certainly an improvement, but it leaves thousands of foreign defendants in
the same situation: detained without any knowledge about their rights to
receive consular assistance from their home country.
Since the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were updated in 2014,
there has not been any proposed federal legislation to bring the United States
202
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into compliance. Whether Senator Leahy has given up or is working on a
new piece of legislation, the necessity of such legislation grows stronger. It
is important for Congress to realize that this bill should not be controversial
amongst party lines. This piece of legislation is needed to ensure the entire
nation’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and most
importantly, it is essential to ensure safety for American citizens by
protecting their reciprocal rights abroad. Out of every piece of legislation
proposed, the CNCA comes the closet to bringing the United States into
compliance. Therefore, this Note recommends that Congress reconsider and
pass legislation, like the CNCA, now that the American public’s climate of
opinion is not as heated as it was about Leal Garcia. Once Americans are
able to comprehend that this legislation will help protect them abroad, there
is no reason it should not pass into law.
The only valid alternative to a congressional act would be that each state
create their own legislation. It would be more beneficial to the nation’s
interests even if only some of the states could make it possible. Any number
is better than zero. However, the state laws presently in place are not strong
enough to bring the United States into compliance with Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention. If the only option is to leave the task up to the
individual states, the states should try to follow the outlined federal scheme
as closely as possible. Unfortunately, state legislatures may be the only path
because of deadlock in Congress. Nobody can know with certainty the
likelihood that all fifty states would pass legislation.
Cases will continue to be appealed, and review and reconsideration as
demanded by Avena will continue to be denied until something is sealed into
law. The United States would not stand for other countries to treat its
citizens in this manner. It is time for America to take a stand and give
foreign defendants the rights our nation agreed to when it signed the Vienna
Convention almost half a century ago.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, the United States needs to make all efforts possible to
comply with its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
Consular relations between nations have been around for centuries, and the
importance has become even more apparent as technology has made
international travel easier. Nothing is worse than being detained or arrested
in another country where one does not speak the language or understand the
laws. The United States needs to make an example for other nations to
follow. Americans have elected senators and congressman into office to put
forth legislation in the people’s best interest, and this legislation is necessary.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/18/2018 9:01 AM

COMPLYING WITH VIENNA CONVENTION POST-MEDELLIN

479

The only way the United States can begin to patch its relations with other
nations and protect U.S. citizens traveling abroad is through sufficient
legislation passed by Congress, which will ensure all fifty states comply with
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.

